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Chapter 8

Dream Interpretation Revisited

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Despite proposed theoretical and clinical modifications emanating from ego psychology, object relations theory and self psychology (for a review, see Fosshage, 1983), Freud's biologically dominated conception of dreams as primarily energy discharging and wish fulfilling in function has remained central to the classical psychoanalytic models of dream formation and dream interpretation. Although the shift from the topographical to the structural models of the mind (Freud, 1923; Arlow and Brenner, 1964), has emphasized in dreams the omnipresence of conflict between the three psychic agencies (id, ego, and superego) the primary impetus for the dream, from a classical vantage point, remains the wish that represents an instinctual drive, *infantile in origin and seeking gratification throughout one's life* (Atteman, 1969). And clinically, although dream interpretation has increasingly focused on the latent conflict, in contrast to simply the

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latent wish, no dream is considered fully analyzed until the infantile sexual or aggressive wishes have been uncovered.

Consistent with the entirety of his personality theory, Freud anchored his clinical finding of latent wishes in dreams in a metapsychological model, i.e., the drive-discharge model, dominated by the biological and physicalistic models of his day. With the recognition that the in-depth scientific investigation of mental states requires that we remain in the realm of psychological discourse, a number of authors with the classical psychoanalytic tradition have contributed to the establishment of a psychoanalytic psychology free from and unfettered by the biological and physicalistic-energy models (Gill, 1967; Holt, 1967; Klein, 1967; Gedo and Goldberg, 1973; Kohut, 1977, 1984; Loewald, 1978; Stolorow and Lachmann, 1980; Atwood and Stolorow, 1984). In a similar vein, I have proposed a revised psychoanalytic model of the psychological function of dreams (Fosshage, 1983, 1987). My purpose here is to set forth briefly this model and to compare the clinical applications of the classical and revised models through a reformulation of a detailed clinical illustration initially presented from the classical perspective.

THE REVISED PSYCHOANALYTIC MODEL

Within the classical model, dreaming is viewed as predominantly the product of a regression to a primitive mode of mentation called primary process. Primary process is economically (energetically) defined as mobile cathexes that press for immediate discharge. Because this mode of mentation theoretically never changes or develops and, thus, remains forever primitive (i.e., unbound energy always presses for discharge and lacks organization), dreams, dominated by primary process mentation, are also viewed as regressed and comparatively primitive products. Although the structural model opened the door theoretically to the participation of complex secondary process ideation through the participation of ego functioning in dream formation, the view of dreams as regressed, primitive primary process products predominates—and the higher-developed and more complex forms of cognition are by and large excluded from dreaming mentation.

Out of the empirical observation of dreams, creative productions, and psychotic mentation on the one hand, and through the theoretical extrication of primary process from its energy-based definition on the other, primary process has gradually become reconceptualized by some as a form of cognition which serves an overall

organizational function of integration and synthesis (Holt, 1967; Noy, 1969, 1979). In keeping with these theoretical contributions, I have proposed that primary process be redefined as follows:

primary process [is] that mode of mental functioning which uses visual and other sensory images with intense affective colorations in serving an overall integrative and synthetic function. Secondary process, on the other hand, is a conceptual and logical mode that makes use of linguistic symbols in serving an integrative and synthetic function. These processes may be described as different but complementary modes of apprehending, responding to, and organizing [the experiential world]. . . . (Fosshage, 1983, p. 649).¹

It is posited that both forms of mentation develop in organizational complexity more or less throughout one's lifetime. In dreaming, both modes are clearly operative, although primary process or representational thinking (using Piaget's term) is usually predominant.

In keeping with this reconceptualization of primary process I have proposed that "*the supraordinate function of dreams is the development, maintenance (regulation), and, when necessary, restoration of psychic processes, structure, and organization* (Fosshage, 1983, p. 657).² Dreaming, as with waking mentation, is an affective-cognitive activity that, in serving an overall organizational function, ranges from the elemental to the most highly complex forms of mentation. The complexity ranges between what might be seen as the elemental repetition of a day's event, similar to a momentary daydream, and the most intricately, imagistically dominated scenario and complex logical problem-solving efforts. Occurring at night, when external input is limited, places dreaming mentation advantageously for dealing with insufficiently attended-to subjective concerns. In providing this organizational function dreaming mentation, as waking, both utilizes and

¹Similarly, McKinnon (1979) describes two cognitive-affective modes of organization, the Visual-Spatial semantic form and the Auditory-Sequential semantic form, which correspond respectively with primary and secondary processes. On the basis of infant research, Lichtenberg (1983) also differentiates between these two modes of mentation.

²Stolorow and Atwood (1982), independently arriving at a similar formulation, refer to the maintenance and consolidation of psychological organization through the dream's concrete representations. Jung (1916) was the first to view dreams as regulatory and developmental, i.e., "compensatory" and "prospective," in function. Ullman (1959), Palombo (1978), Breger (1977), and Jones (1980) speak of the adaptive function; French and Fromm (1964) of the conflict-resolving function; De Monchaux (1978) of the trauma-integrating function; and Greenberg (1985) of the production of schemas (for a more complete review, refer to Fosshage, 1983).

maintains our primary organizational principles, i.e., the thematic ways in which we organize our experience (Atwood and Stolorow, 1984).

Dreaming mentation frequently continues the management of sexual, aggressive, and narcissistically related processes which have been stimulated, but insufficiently modulated, during the day. Kohut (1977) noted this regulatory function in some dreams, called "self-state dreams," in which the dream would manifestly attempt to deal with an "uncontrollable tension-increase or . . . [a] dread of the dissolution of the self. . . . by covering frightening nameless processes with nameable visual imagery" (p. 109). Within the revised model wish-fulfillment, central to the classical model, is no longer viewed either as a defensive process or as a fantasied gratification of libidinal or aggressive impulses with the primary function of discharge, but rather as an avenue of regulation and management of affective-cognitive experiences.

Dreaming mentation not only serves to maintain organization, but contributes to the development of new organizations, a crucially important dream function that has remained unrecognized within the classical model. Dreams frequently further the consolidation of emergent affect-laden images of self and other. The fundamental motivational principle posited by Kohut (1984), namely, "the self" striving to realize its "nuclear program of action," can be viewed as operative in dreaming mentation, as in waking, to bring about incremental developmental movements. Because these developmental movements may first appear in dreams, their recognition is crucially important in order to further the consolidation of ongoing changes.

Dreams also continue "the unconscious and conscious waking efforts to resolve intrapsychic conflicts through the utilization of defensive processes, through an internal balancing or through a creative, newly emergent re-organization. . . ." (Fossbage, 1983, p. 658). In contrast to the classical intersystemic conflict model, wherein conflicts are viewed as ubiquitous in dreams with little movement toward resolution, with the revised model conflicts are not seen as always present or the most salient issue in dreams, but, when they are, the higher-order function of conflict resolution is always operative, even if not successful, just as in waking mentation.³

With regard to the manifest-latent content distinction that is central

³I am not suggesting that dreaming mentation is always successful in its functioning, just as is the case with waking mentation. An obvious example is the nightmare, wherein dreaming mental efforts are unsuccessful in regulating intense anxiety-producing processes. Clinically, of course, we must remain focused on the dreamer's experience to elucidate the salient issues and the dream's function.

to the classical model, because the revised model posits that dreams serve developmental and maintenance functions, "*there is no theoretical necessity to posit the ubiquitous operation of disguise and transformation of latent into manifest content*" (p. 652). For example, Kohut (1977) clinically noted that associations did not lead away from the manifest content to a presumed latent content in self-state dreams. Defensive operations are utilized in dreaming, as in waking mentation, only in response to anxiety-producing conflict. When intrapsychic conflict is present, however, the use of defenses—resulting in a manifest-latent content discrepancy—varies, as with waking mentation, with the intensity of the conflict and the dreamer's recognition, clarity, and acceptance of the conflict. Rather than assuming from the vantage point of the classical model the omnipresence of defensive functioning and the corresponding differentiation between manifest and latent content, it is proposed within this model that, instead of utilizing the terms "manifest" and "latent content," we refer more precisely to *the dream content* that may or may not involve defensive functioning. When defensive operations are present, they will be empirically discovered (not assumed a priori) through the dreamer's associations.

Dream images are poignantly meaningful representations that serve as thematic or organizational nodal points. The primary clinical task, in contrast to the translation of dream images, is to amplify and elucidate the meanings of the chosen images. For example, in contrast to the common assumption that the analyst is always, at least latently, in the dream, with the revised model the analyst is never *assumed* to be present in the dream unless he or she actually appears. However, because the primary organizational patterns are operative in both dreams as well as in the transference relationship,⁴ the analytic discussion, without requiring translation, can focus on the particular organizational pattern as it emerges in the dream as well as in the transference. When the dream image is not translated, its significance will be better understood and the appearance of the identical organizational principle in the transference will be thoroughly understood when it is operative. To assume incorrectly that a particular organizational theme is operative in the transference, and has precipitated the dream, is restrictive and potentially undermines the richness of object relations and organizational complexity, and/or of re-organizational developments. Thus, associational activity is more focused, aimed at elucidating the images within the context of the dream and the experience of the dreamer within the dream. To re-

⁴Stolorow and Lachmann (1984) redefine transference as the operation of primary organizational principles within the analytic relationship.

main at the phenomenological level elucidates the poignant meanings of dream images, increases the dreamer's participation and conviction in the understanding of the dream, and minimizes the potential imposition of the analyst's idiosyncratic organizations of the dream data.

Within this model, dreaming, rather than providing a royal road to latent wishes and intersystemic (id, ego, and superego) conflicts, is accorded a far more profound role in its developmental, regulatory, conflict-resolving, and restorative functions. Dreaming mentation—as waking mentation—utilizes, maintains, and transforms a person's primary organizational principles. The view that defenses are operative in dreaming mentation only in particular instances of intense intrapsychic conflict enables us in the clinical arena to observe more directly—i.e., usually without translation—the meanings of particular dream images and themes. The recognition that dreaming, at times, can initiate and further emergent psychological organizations in keeping with developmental strivings and, in so doing, can express representationally incremental developmental achievements, facilitates the use of dreams in analysis to enhance this consolidation process.

A CLINICAL ILLUSTRATION

For comparison of the clinical applications of the classical and revised psychoanalytic models, I have chosen a dream of a patient presented by Ralph Greenson (1970)⁵ a highly respected classical analyst who was especially well known for his work with dreams. My reformulation of the understanding and interpretation of the dream is not to be considered exhaustive, for I have intentionally limited myself to address the most salient features of the dream, a process which, of course, is usually paralleled in the clinical situation.

The patient, Mr. M., was a thirty-year-old writer "who came for analytic treatment because of a constant sense of underlying depressiveness, frequent anxiety in social and sexual situations, and a feeling of being a failure despite considerable success in his profession and what appeared to be a good relationship to his wife and children" (Greenson, p. 534). The second dream of Mr. M., which is

⁵I wish to express my gratitude to Mrs. Hildi Greenson, Executrix of the Estate of Ralph Greenson, and to the *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* for permission to reprint the clinical material from Dr. Greenson's (1970) article, "The Exceptional Position of the Dream."

the one I focus on, occurred about two and a half years after his first dream. Greenson writes:

The patient had to interrupt his analysis for six months because of a professional assignment abroad and returned some three months before [having] the dream. During this three-month interval of analytic work Mr. M. was in a chronic state of quiet, passive depression. I had interpreted this as a reaction to his wife's fourth pregnancy, which must have stirred up memories and feelings in regard to his mother's three pregnancies after his birth. It seemed clear to me that he was reexperiencing the loss of the feeling and fantasies of being his mother's favorite, the only child and the favorite child. The patient accepted my interpretations submissively and conceded they had merit, but he could recall nothing about the birth of his three siblings nor his reactions, although he was over six when the youngest was born. My interpretations had no appreciable influence on his mood.

Mr. M. came to the hour I shall now present, sadly and quietly, and in a somewhat mournful tone recounted the following dream:

"I am in a huge store, a department store. There are lots of shiny orange and green plastic raincoats on display. A middle-aged Jewish woman is arranging other articles of clothing. Nearby is a female manikin dressed in a gray flannel dress. I go outside and see a woman who looks very familiar but I can't say specifically who she is. She is waiting expectantly and eagerly for me near a small surrey, putting clothes in it. I feel sorry for the poor horse and then realize the surrey is detached from the horse. I lift up the surrey to connect it and I am surprised how light the surrey is, but I don't know how to hitch it up to the horse. I also realize then that I was silly to feel sorry for the horse."

Mr. M.'s associations were as follows: "The three women in the dream were so different from one another. The older Jewish woman was a motherly type, working, doing, arranging, like my own mother used to before she became bedridden. The manikin reminds me of how I used to think of gentile girls when I was a kid; beautiful, pure, and cold, like my wife. But they taught me different. The best sex I have ever experienced was only with gentile girls. Jewish women just don't turn me on. They never did. Since my wife's pregnancy our sex life is practically nil. She isn't feeling well and I must say I'm in no mood for sex. I would like to be close to her in bed, but I don't want her to think it is a sexual demand so there is no talking even. I'd like to just be close and cuddle. My wife is so quiet of late. I feel she is getting revenge on me for all my past wrongs. I never realized before I had had such a bad temper and that she had been and still is so afraid of me. [Pause] I feel so alone in that big house of ours. I work like a horse to pay for it. Maybe I am the horse in the dream that I felt sorry for."

I [Greenson] intervened. "It might be so. You think he had such a big load to carry, but then you lift up the buggy and you are surprised

to discover how light it is." [Greenson immediately addresses what from his and my perspective is the most striking feature in the dream.] The patient interrupted me. "That buggy is so light, it's a baby buggy, it's a baby carriage. No wonder it was so light, it was so tiny, and the woman was putting clothes in it, like diapers." [Pause] I interrupted. "A baby buggy is very heavy for a little boy, he has to work like a horse to push it." [Greenson here shifts the focus to the historical context.] Mr. M. burst in with, "I can remember trying to push my baby sister in her buggy but it was too heavy for me. Now I see my father carrying the baby carriage downstairs as if it were a toy. I can even remember my brother and me together trying to push it." [Mr. M. easily relates to his past and confirms Greenson's portrayal of the boy's experience of the baby buggy as heavy. The crucially important intonation and affect are absent, but I wonder if Mr. M. is not recalling his father's ease in handling the baby carriage with some admiration, a point that I will discuss later.] [In contrast,] I [Greenson] interpreted and reconstructed: "I believe you have been depressed ever since your wife got pregnant because it stirred up memories of how you reacted when you were a small boy and your mother got pregnant and delivered your brother and sisters. You didn't want to face the fact that your father was hitched up to the coming of the babies. You wished you could have been the father of the babies. But you weren't—you didn't know how to do it as a little boy and you felt left out in the cold, detached. You have been depressed about this ever since." [Through this theoretically dominated reconstruction of the oedipal rivalry and defeat, Greenson shifts the focus away from the dream element with its much lighter affective tone, expressed in such statements of the dreamer as "I am surprised how light the surrey is," and supplies instead an explanation of feelings of depression and defeat, a focus which corresponds with the patient's waking, in contrast to dreaming, affective state. Following the interpretation, Mr. M. seems to comply and to feel like a defeated man.] After a pause, Mr. M. said, "I've always felt I'm not a real man. I act like one, but inside I still feel a real man should be like my father; strong physically, tough, and unafraid. I can fly airplanes but my hands sweat whenever I want to screw my own wife [pp. 540-542].

Using the classical dream model Greenson presents his rationale for the reconstruction of the oedipal defeat: "I could see now the dream work had condensed, reversed, and disguised the agony of feeling abandoned, unloved, inept, and depressed by pictorializing an attractive woman waiting eagerly for him to join her" (Greenson, p. 543). Greenson clearly views the attractive woman waiting eagerly for the dreamer to join her as a wish-fulfillment which, serving a defensive function, conceals the underlying feelings of abandonment and depression. To posit the ubiquity of the manifest and latent content distinction paves the way for "free," i.e., free from content, and

theoretically dominated translations of dream images, changing in this instance the central affective tone of the image itself. The consequent negation of the positive, affectively toned dream element corresponds with Garma's (1978) formulation that any solution in a dream is but a "fictitious solution," a wish fulfillment that is a disguise and not to be trusted. Similarly, despite the fact that the patient associatively related the middle-aged Jewish woman to his mother, Greenson states that the "familiar but unrecognizable woman is the mother of his childhood years, whom he has tried to ward off in his memories, in his sexual life, and in the analysis." (If this were true, namely, the eagerly awaiting woman were an accurate portrayal of his mother, the patient very likely would not be in his present predicament.) And, despite the fact that the dreamer's last statement was, "I also realized then that I was silly to feel sorry for the horse," Greenson concludes that the patient is "full of jealousy, envy, and depression, and [feeling] sorry for himself" (Greenson, p. 543). Contradicting the dreamer's associations and the dreamer's experience in the dream, Greenson, through the use of the classical dream and psychosexual developmental models, has translated the dream figures, altered a primary affect in the dream, and construed the dream function to be primarily defensive in that the dream conceals the patient's underlying "jealousy, envy, and depression."

Greenson continues:

In the next hour the meaning of the green and orange raincoats became clear. The patient spontaneously recalled some dirty jokes from early puberty in which the terms "raincoat" and "rubbers" were used to refer to condoms. He then remembered finding condoms in his father's chest of drawers and later stealing some for his own use, just in case an opportunity presented itself, which, he wistfully said, "didn't occur for several years." By that time the rubbers, the raincoats, had disintegrated in his wallet. It is worth noting how the hidden old shreds of "rubbers" in the patient's associations were changed into the shiny new raincoats on display in the dream. Here you can see the attempt at wish-fulfillment in the manifest content of the dream: "I can buy conspicuous sexual potency in a store or in analysis." Later it also became clear that I too was the poor horse who had him as a big load to carry and also I was the 'horse's ass' who could not help him make proper sexual connections with his wife or any other woman [p. 542].

Mr. M. associates raincoats, in what might be viewed as the theoretically "expected" direction, to condoms; but, despite the possible analytic influence on associational activity, the theme of inadequacy and defeat reemerges. Greenson, once again, understands the shiny

new raincoats as a defensive disguise of the shreds of old "rubbers". Translating the department store to refer to the analysis, Greenson interprets Mr. M.'s attempt to buy sexual potency through the analysis as a wish-fulfillment which, in this instance, represents an infantile desire to be ultimately renounced. This formulation, from my vantage point, would have, at least momentarily, crushed Mr. M.'s hope to gain sexual potency and, more generally, self-potency through the analysis, a wish which, rather than a representative of an infantile drive, is more accurately viewed as an expression of a *developmental striving*. Indeed, Mr. M.'s view of the analyst as "the 'horse's ass' who could not help him make proper sexual connections with his wife or any other woman" followed and might have been his reaction to the disheartening interpretation and ensuing empathic rupture.

Using the revised psychoanalytic model of dreams minimizes (but, of course, does not eliminate) the possibility of arbitrary and theoretically dominated translations of dream personages and events and enables us *to remain close to the experience of the dreamer*. From this vantage point let us first examine the patient's associations and then readdress the dream. In his initial associations, prior to the analyst's interventions, Mr. M. mentions his mother and gentile girls, but focuses primarily on his current life situation. A repetitive sequence emerges in which Mr. M. expresses feelings of having, of being responded to, and of satisfaction, followed by experiences of abandonment and disappointment: "The older Jewish woman was a motherly type, working, doing, arranging, like my own mother used to *before she became bedridden*." [italics added] He then anticipates a lack of responsiveness: "The manikin reminds me of how I used to think of gentile girls when I was a kid; beautiful, pure, and cold, like my wife"; but was pleasantly surprised, "they taught me different." With satisfaction Mr. M. recounts, "The best sex I have ever experienced was only with gentile girls"; but he immediately follows with a sense of disappointment, "Since my wife's pregnancy our sex life is practically nil." He begins to defensively maneuver, "And I must say I'm in no mood for sex"; but his needs and desires immediately reemerge, "I'd like to just be close and cuddle." However, disappointment ensues once again, "My wife is so quiet of late," and he begins to blame himself, "I never realized before I had had such a bad temper and that she had been and still is so afraid of me." He ends up feeling "alone in that big house of ours" and burdened, "I work like a horse to pay for it"; and makes the poignant connection between his waking and dreaming experiences, "Maybe I am the horse in the dream that I felt sorry for." This thematic experience of the ruptures of the needed responsiveness from others (as ruptures in the self-

selfobject matrix) leaves him feeling depleted and depressed. In order to protect himself from further disappointment, he avoids asserting his needs, "but I don't want her to think it is a sexual demand so there is no talking even" (p. 541).

With Mr. M.'s waking thoughts in mind let us turn to his dream. In light of the fact that Mr. M. had been a child of impoverished parents and was embarrassed by his shabby, dirty clothing, the dream interestingly opens in a huge department store where there were "lots of shiny orange and green plastic raincoats on display." Although we need the dreamer's elaboration of his mood at this point and thoughts as to his reaction to and the meaning of the raincoats, the dream appears to open in a "bright" mood with a sense of plentitude in the world, i.e., a huge department store, and with a busily caring, middle-aged, motherly Jewish woman. In contrast, and paralleling the sequential unfolding of his associations, a female manikin dressed in a gray flannel dress stands nearby—epitomizing a cold, lifeless, and unresponsive female. However, the dreamer proceeds to go outside and encounters a woman "who looks very familiar" and who "is waiting expectantly and eagerly for me near a small surrey, putting clothes in it." The dreamer envisions a responsive and caring woman, a woman who eagerly awaits him. His associating the surrey to a baby buggy suggests that the familiar woman and he are securing baby clothes for their expected child and, in contrast to his own childhood deprivation, they are preparing to provide more adequately for the expected baby—a hopeful and psychologically reparative enactment. The act of providing is experienced momentarily as a heavy burden, "I feel sorry for the poor horse," an old configuration that must have developed out of his childhood experience in which, feeling abandoned by his mother, he had to attend to his younger siblings. However *something new occurs*. The dreamer "realizes the surrey is detached from the horse. I lift up the surrey to connect it and I am surprised how light the surrey is. . . ." The horse is no longer connected to the burdensome surrey of the past so that the dreamer realizes "that I was silly to feel sorry for the horse." The dreamer is experiencing something new, namely, the lightness of the surrey, and, although he does not know yet quite how to make this connection, he is in the process of an important discovery. In contrast to organizing his current experience according to the pattern of abandonment, deprivation, and burdensomeness—a pattern previously established in childhood—the dreamer, instead, is envisioning and experiencing imagistically an eagerly caring woman, preparations of baby clothing, and a potential lightness in the previously burdensome task of being a father and a husband—a developmental step of

no small magnitude. Through this internal reorganization Mr. M. is in the process of emerging from his depressed, anxious, and weakened state and consolidating a more positive, potent sense of himself. Using the classical model, the dream was viewed essentially as a disguise of his underlying depression; using the revised model, it is viewed as a mental attempt to reorganize in keeping with developmental strivings in order to emerge from a depleted, burdened, and depressed state.⁶

What are the transference implications of the dream? From my vantage point the dreamer is primarily engaged in an intrapsychic reorganizational effort to emerge from a depleted and depressed state. Primary developmental strivings are potentially rekindled and supported within the self-selfobject matrix of the analytic relationship. Despite the reported ineffectiveness of Greenson's interpretations prior to the dream, a sufficient self-selfobject connection arising from Mr. M.'s developmental motivation, and Greenson's availability, must have been established to enable the dreamer to report his dream and, perhaps, even to dream it. The organizational sequence of hoped-for responsiveness followed by anticipated and ensuing disappointments, evident in Mr. M.'s dream and associations involving his current and past life, undoubtedly must also have operated frequently within the transference relationship (e.g., his more energetic responses to Greenson's initial interventions and his apparent depletion following the oedipal interpretation). This scenario can be addressed as it occurs within the analytic relationship, as well as in the relationship to his wife, without requiring translations, and what from my vantage point would be distortions, of the dream images. At the moment the dreamer is internally capable of envisioning an eagerly awaiting woman that results in a new lightness of the buggy. To shift the focus to the self-selfobject matrix in the analytic arena could potentially undermine the dreamer's emergent capacity to envision this more hopeful situation by subtly locating the impetus

⁶Discussion following the presentation of this paper pointed on several occasions to a misunderstanding that I would focus exclusively on the developmental strivings and progressive movements in dreams. I believe that this misunderstanding was based, at least in part, on the presentation of only one clinical illustration, Mr. M.'s dream, that exquisitely demonstrates the achievement of novel reorganizations brought about through dreaming mentation. In other dreams, however, the maintenance or regulatory functions may predominate and developmental strivings would not otherwise be apparent. And, in still other dreams, intense affect-ridden conflicts may overwhelm effective psychological functioning so that no function is clearly identifiable. Dreams, in these instances, poignantly portray the experiential position and predicament of the dreamer, whether it be a state dominated by acute anxiety or intense despair.

of the developmental movement within the experience of the analyst's responsiveness. The crucial importance of the analyst's responsiveness notwithstanding, it is the patient's motivational thrust and capacity that enables him to make use of the analyst's responsiveness and availability. In this instance, to emphasize the patient's experience of the analyst as affirming, or even his use of the analyst to provide a mirroring selfobject function, shifts the focus away from the patient's current internal self-cohesive capacity and potentially could undermine the further consolidation of that capacity. Thus, in this instance, the recognition and implicit affirmation of the internal incremental developmental achievement both provides a sufficient responsiveness to continue the maintenance of a viable self-selfobject connection within the analytic relationship and furthers the self-consolidation process.

With regard to interventions, following Mr. M.'s initial associations where he ended up with the old scenario feeling burdened and lonely (additional confirmation that this old scenario was more available to him in his waking mentation), I would have inquired, "But how did you feel when you discovered that the surrey was light?" And at another point I would have asked, "How did you feel about the woman waiting expectantly and eagerly for you?" With these questions I am attempting to reconnect the dreamer experientially to these important new, affectively potent developments in the dream and to further their elucidation and consolidation. We would probably arrive together at a formulation something like, "In the dream you are realizing something new—the surrey is not heavy, but light, and although you didn't quite know how to hitch this new surrey or realization up to the horse, you realized that there is no need to feel sorry for the horse—that the horse is not burdened after all." I would use as much as possible the intense affect-laden images of the dream, or, in other words, primary process mentation as our mode of communication, so that the patient can experience these new developments as fully as possible in his waking life. In order to utilize and integrate both waking and dreaming mentation, I would inquire if he had been aware in his waking life of experiencing or envisioning feeling lighter and less burdened in relation to his expectant wife. And toward further integration of these changes, if Mr. M. had said as he did to the analyst, "Now I see my father carrying the baby carriage downstairs as if it were a toy," after requesting elaboration of his feeling about this scene, I would have embraced (i.e., if I sense the affect correctly) the admiration and identification with his father in saying, "You seemed to have admired your father and to have wanted to be like him at that moment, and in the dream you have envi-

sioned that you too can be like your father and can easily carry that light surrey."

I have posited that the supraordinate function of dreaming is to develop, maintain, and regulate psychological processes and organization. Of course when regulatory and developmental strivings have been seriously undermined, the dream, as with waking mentation, may poignantly express states of depletion, fragmentation, and endless despair. Mr. M.'s dream, however, exemplifies how we are able to reorganize and further incremental developmental movements through dreaming mentation. The crucially important recognition of these reorganizational and developmental efforts with the aid of the revised psychoanalytic model enables us to embrace these efforts as they appear in dreaming mentation and, thus, through the utilization of dreams to further the developmental process. With regard to the previously analyzed dream, the fact that the woman is unknown and that the dreamer does not know how to hitch the light surrey up to the horse, suggests that he has yet to integrate these new possibilities, requiring all the more our therapeutic use of this dream to consolidate further this new, and in this instance, uplifting reorganization.

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